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Abstract  
A Risk Based Inspection (RBI) scheme is a planning tool used to develop the optimum 
plan  for  the  execution  of  inspection  activities.  Organic  certification  system  could 
benefit  from  the  implementation  of  RBIs  in  terms  of  higher  effectiveness,  i.e. 
trustability, and lower transaction costs for organic operators. Data from certification 
bodies  provide  basic  information  about  non-compliances  and  structural  aspects  of 
organic  operators.  Here  we  propose  a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  a p p r o a c h  t o  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  
modelling, based on discrete choice models and Bayesian networks, both aiming at 
the identification of key risk factor in the organic certification process in the European 
Union. 
Introduction 
The goal of Risk Based Inspections (RBIs) is to develop a cost-effective inspection 
and  maintenance  programme  that  provides  assurance  of  acceptable  integrity  and 
reliability. RBIs use the findings from a formal risk analysis – according to defined 
criteria  - t o  g u i d e  t h e  d i r e c t ion  and  emphasis  of  the  inspection  planning  and  the 
physical inspection procedures. A risk-based approach to inspection planning in the 
organic  certification  system  should  consider  two  aspects:  the  improvement  in  the 
analysis  of  the  probability  of  a  fraud  or  non-compliance  to  be  detected,  and  the 
economic  evaluation  of  a  higher  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  the  certification 
system. 
Here  we  particularly  focus  on  the  first  aspect,  and  discuss  some  methodological 
proposals based on discrete choice models and Bayesian networks (BN) to analyse 
the probabilities of non-compliances with respect to the rules and regulation of the 
organic farming practices. The aim is to provide tools to support inspections and to 
focus efforts onto the most critical categories of organic operators, both farmers and 
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processors.  The  implementation  of  a  codified  RBI  approach  becomes  particularly 
relevant if it can be harmonised at the level of general elements a system should 
contain, and then applied to certification systems of different countries. Therefore we 
also discuss some relevant issues concerning the availability of standardised control 
data from the European organic certification bodies.  
Materials and methods 
In  operative  terms,  modelling  harmonised  RBIs  for  the  organic  system  means  to 
explain  the  probability  of  detection  of  non-compliances  conditional  to  a  set  of  risk 
factors, or variables. Two aspects are therefore involved: a harmonised dataset of 
relevant information for organic certification systems, and a set of methods to properly 
assess relevant risk functions. For what concerns the first aspect, from the perspective 
of a harmonised RBI a first crucial issue is that the central term non-compliance is not 
clearly defined in the EU regulation. Non-compliances are classified as irregularities 
and infringements (REG 2091/91) though no explicit definition is provided. From the 
analysis of REG 834/2007, however, we can conclude that irregularities refer to non 
compliances concerning documental/formal aspects and temporary violation of Reg 
834/2007, while infringements refer to non compliances concerning violation with long 
term effects (also documental/formal). In this research we have collected data from 
certification  bodies  in  Italy,  Denmark,  Germany,  Switzerland,  Check  Republic  and 
United Kingdom. A wide range of structural variables are available for each country, 
like land area, livestock, type of crops etc, and they have been homogenised as well, 
using Eurostat classifications where applicable.  
Results  
Information on non compliance and related sanctions is stored by control bodies of 
each  country  according  to  different  definitions  and  schemes,  and  no  detailed 
information on the type and severity of non compliances encountered is available in an 
electronic format for all of them. Therefore, we have used the type of sanctions, for 
which data are available in detail, as an indicator of relevant non-conformities and of 
their  degree  of  severity.  Following  the  approach  of  Accredia  (Italian  accreditation 
body) for defining which sanction shall be associated to each type of non compliance, 
and  thanks  to  the  support  of  ICEA  and  IMO  qualified  staff,  we  have  provided  a 
homogenised classification of sanctions for all countries, and have grouped similar 
sanction  types  into  four  classes,  corresponding  to  irregularities  and  infringements 
(Tab. 1).  
Tab. 1 Scheme for homogenisation of sanctions and non-compliances  
    Nr of country specific sanctions types 
Homogenised 
sanction type 
Type of non 
compliance  CH  CZ  DE   DK   IT  UK* 
Slight  5  1  3  4  1  1 
Moderate 
Irregularities 
4  1  1  3  1  1 
Severe  5  1  1  3  1  1 
Extreme 
Infringements 
2  1  2  2  2  1 
* Non-compliances   
 
Note  that  for  UK  no  data  on  sanctions  are  available,  but  differently  from  other 
countries, non-compliances are codified in terms of severity, which allowed us to use 
the  same  classification  used  for  sanctions,  though  of  course  they  are  not  directly 
comparable.  A  common  database  has  been  produced,  merging  data  from  each 
country, that includes 84386 operators, both pure farmers, pure processors and mixed 
farmer/processors. The database contains more than 900 variables, though with many 
missing values as not all data are available for all countries. Structural variables have 
been  used  to  specify  hypotheses  concerning  relevant  risk  factors,  which  can  be 
summarised as indicated in Tab. 2. 
Tab. 2 Variables hypothesized to be related to risk factors  
Risk factor category  Variables 
General risk aspects 
(all operators) 
Operators who got sanctions in the past; operators with other 
certification schemes; operator experience as organic 
Structural/managerial 
aspects (farmers) 
Size (UAA, Livestock units), size related indexes (e.g. UAA < 
10 ha), processing activity, non organic land/livestock, 
production complexity (e.g. number of crops/species), crops 
and livestock types (Eurostat classification)  
Structural/managerial 
aspects (processors) 
Number of products, turnover, farming activity, product types. 
Discussion  
In  terms  of  RBIs,  we  are  interested  to  assess  the  probability  of  detecting  non-
conformities when a set of “risk variables” takes specific values. Different results can 
be obtained: an impact evaluation of single risk factors, and the impact evaluation of 
different  combination  of  variables  (farm  types)  jointly  considered.  The  aim  is  to 
discriminate between low and high-risk operators. Discrete choice models (particularly 
Logit and Poisson models, cf. Greene, 2008) and Bayesian networks (Horvitz et al., 
1988, Jensen 1996) are used to model non-compliances probabilities. 
Logistic models estimate the probability of a sanction to be detected (Y=1), given a set 
of explanatory variables x and a set of coefficients β, as: 
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while  Poisson  models  estimate  the  probability  of  detecting  a  discrete  number  of 
sanction (Y=yi) as follows: 
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BNs  have  an  alternative  approach  based  on  conditional  probabilities  and  can  be 
interpreted  as  a  model  of  the  interactions  among  a  set  of  variables,  where  each 
variable has a finite set of mutually exclusive states. Information about the actual state 
of one or more variables (evidences) can be used also to evaluate the probabilities of 
different variable configurations, i.e. to simulate what the probability of a specific state 
of the network would be. For instance, given two variables A and B, and an evidence  
 
set e, BNs can compute the probability that A and B assume respectively the states a, 
b: 
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The econometric approach allows testing statistically the relevance of risk factors, and 
their impact on the probability of non-compliances, while the BN approach provides an 
estimate of the impact of different combinations of risk factors on the probability of 
non-compliances. 
Conclusions  
Harmonised RBI is crucial to guarantee integrity, improve efficiency and reduce the 
cost  of  inspections:  a  growing  body  of  small  “organic”  farmers  and  growers  are 
refusing certification and inspection schemes and selling on alternative short supply-
chains – this creates further confusion among consumers. A set of econometric and 
statistical tools allow to identify the critical risk factors to be considered for detecting 
non  compliances,  hence  providing  a  scientific  support  to  the  focussing  of  control 
activities  towards  more  risky  cases.  Such  modelling  approach  requires  however  a 
great  effort  in  data  collection  and  harmonisation.  Clear  and  uniform  criteria  for 
classifying non-compliances and better data and information systems are required to 
successfully implement RBIs on a larger scale. 
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